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Diffstat (limited to 'website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html b/website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html index c1e906c..c198626 100644 --- a/website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html +++ b/website/posts/reproducible-build-summit.html @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ tags: Reproducible builds resources at <a href="https://tests.reproducible-builds.org/">tests.reproducible-builds.org</a> to achieve that soon. Since last year's summit, - our <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/html_node/Submitting-Patches.html">patch + our <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/en/html_node/Submitting-Patches.html">patch submission guidelines</a> require submitters to check for reproducibility issues using <tt>guix build --rounds=<i>N</i></tt>. This has already allowed us to fix lots of reproducibility issues in @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ tags: Reproducible builds <p> dkg of Debian and ACLU led a couple of sessions on this topic. Tools - like <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/html_node/Invoking-guix-challenge.html"><tt>guix + like <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/en/html_node/Invoking-guix-challenge.html"><tt>guix challenge</tt></a> are one way to help users check whether their binaries are trustworthy, provided independent package builds are available. Some suggested that this could be used as an input for a @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ tags: Reproducible builds <p> Guix currently allows users to specify multiple binary providers through - the <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/html_node/Substitutes.html"><tt>--substitute-urls</tt></a> option. + the <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/en/html_node/Substitutes.html"><tt>--substitute-urls</tt></a> option. We hope we can extend it to support this “<i>k</i> out of <i>n</i>” policy by the next Reproducible Build Summit! </p> @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ tags: Reproducible builds language it compiles, and thus distributors have no choice but to start from an opaque pre-built binary provided by upstream. The problem also comes up - when <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/html_node/Bootstrapping.html">building + when <a href="https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/manual/en/html_node/Bootstrapping.html">building a complete system “from nothing”</a>. This situation prevents users from knowing what code they’re running, and it makes them vulnerable to <a href="https://www.win.tue.nl/~aeb/linux/hh/thompson/trust.html"><i>trusting |